"Is Beijing Preparing to Wage a ‘People’s War’ in the South China Sea?
China’s leaders might have to — or risk a backlash at home
by JAMES HOLMES
Last week China’s defense minister, Gen. Chang Wanquan, implored the nation to ready itself for a “people’s war at sea.”
The purpose of such a campaign? To “safeguard sovereignty” after an
adverse ruling from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.
The tribunal upheld the plain meaning of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, ruling that Beijing’s claims to “indisputable sovereignty” spanning some 80–90 percent of the South China Sea are bunk.
A
strong coastal state, in other words, cannot simply wrest away the high
seas or waters allocated to weaker neighbors and make them its own. Or,
at any rate, it can’t do so lawfully. It could conceivably do so
through conquest, enforced afterward by a constant military presence.
Defenders
of freedom of the sea, consequently, must heed Chang’s entreaty.
Southeast Asians and their external allies must take such statements
seriously — devoting ample forethought to the prospect of maritime
combat in the South China Sea.
That’s
the first point about a people’s war at sea. A clash of arms is
possible. Statesmen and commanders in places like Manila, Hanoi and
Washington must not discount Chang’s words as mere bluster.
Indeed,
it’s doubtful China could comply with the UNCLOS tribunal’s ruling at
this stage, even if the Chinese Communist Party leadership wished to.
Think about the image compliance would project at home.
For
two decades now, Beijing has invested lavishly in a great navy, and
backed that navy up with shore-based firepower in the form of combat
aircraft, anti-ship missile batteries, and short-range warships such as
fast patrol craft and diesel submarines.
Party
leaders have regaled the populace with how they will use seagoing
forces to right historical wrongs and win the nation nautical renown.
They must now follow through.
It was foolish to tie China’s national dignity and sovereignty to patently absurd
claims to islands and seas. But party leaders did so. And they did so
repeatedly, publicly and in the most unyielding terms imaginable. By
their words they stoked nationalist sentiment while making themselves
accountable to it.
They set in motion a toxic cycle of rising popular expectations. Breaking that cycle could verge on impossible.
If
Beijing relented from its maritime claims now, ordinary Chinese
would — rightly — judge the leadership by the standard it set. Party
leaders would stand condemned as weaklings who surrendered sacred
territory, failed to avenge China’s century of humiliation despite China’s rise to great power, and let jurists and lesser neighbors backed by a certain superpower flout big, bad China’s will."
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